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ABSTRACT. In the context of still uncertain specific effects of climate change in specific locations, this paper examines whether
education significantly increases coping capacity with regard to particular climatic changes, and whether it improves the resilience
of people to climate risks in general. Our hypothesis is that investment in universal primary and secondary education around
the world is the most effective strategy for preparing to cope with the still uncertain dangers associated with future climate. The
empirical evidence presented for a cross-country time series of factors associated with past natural disaster fatalities since 1980
in 125 countries confirms this overriding importance of education in reducing impacts. We also present new projections of
populations by age, sex, and level of educational attainment to 2050, thus providing an appropriate tool for anticipating societies’
future adaptive capacities based on alternative education scenarios associated with different policies.
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INTRODUCTION
There is little doubt that climate change is already ongoing
and more change is to be expected (Solomon et al. 2007). A
number of organizations have assessed the costs of adapting
to these changes, with the most recent of these estimates being
in the range of US$70 to 100 billion each year, and with the
greatest losses being associated with increases in magnitude
and frequency of extreme weather events (World Bank 2010a).
However, the specific effects of climate change that will be
experienced in specific locations are highly uncertain, and this
creates a challenge for investments into climate-protective
infrastructure (Dessai et al. 2009). An increasing number of
researchers, both in academia (Agrawal and Perrin 2009,
McBean and Rodgers 2010) and in the public sector (Agrawala
et al. 2008, Schipper et al. 2008, World Bank 2010b), suggest
that the most sensible investments in adaptation, or
government interventions, may be those that focus not on
directly addressing particular climatic changes, but rather on
t hose that improve the resilience and reduce the vulnerability
of people to climate risks in general (Eakin and Patt 2011).
Here we examine the effects of one particular intervention,
education, on losses from extreme weather events. 
The idea that social and human development can improve
resilience to climate change and extreme weather events is not
new. A number of studies have compared losses from climate
hazards with a number of development indicators, finding
significant correlations with income, population density,
access to drinking water, female fertility, and a number of
indicators of good governance and public corruption (Yohe
and Tol 2002, United Nations Development Programme 2004,
Brooks et al. 2005, Kellenberg and Mobarak 2008, Patt et al.
2010). The most recent one of these (Patt et al. 2010) has
looked explicitly at the human development index (HDI) as
an indicator of disaster vulnerability. HDI is a composite
indicator derived from indexes of income, life expectancy at
birth, and education. This study has revealed a nonmonotonic
relationship that as yet is causally unexplained: initial
improvements in HDI correlate with increasing vulnerability
to climatic risks, while further improvements then correlate
with falling risk levels.  
No detailed empirical study to date has broken down HDI into
its composite elements to consider education alone, nor has
any study compared the effects of different education
indicators. A possible reason for this could be the lack of
detailed and consistent empirical information on level of
education across countries and over time. This situation has
recently been improved through the reconstructions and
projections of educational attainment distributions by age, sex,
and four levels of educational attainment for most countries
in the world (Lutz et al. 2007, KC et al. 2010). A critical feature
of these data, which has allowed researchers to use them to
show the effects of education on economic growth, was their
disaggregation of education across age groups.  
There are several reasons to expect empowerment to occur
through basic literacy and subsequently through secondary
education to reduce vulnerability to climate change related
risks. Most directly, better education typically implies better
access to relevant information, such as early warnings for
tropical storms or seasonal prediction of drought (Patt et al.
2007, Moser and Ekstrom 2010). Second, there is evidence
that education also enhances cognitive skills and the
willingness to change risky behavior while at the same time
extending the personal planning horizon (Neisser et al. 1996,
Behrman and Stacey 1997, Nisbett 2009). Third, there is
scientific evidence that education leads to better health and
physical wellbeing at any given age, in virtually every country
(Fuchs et al. 2010, KC 2010). Fourth, more education leads
to higher income at the individual and household level as well
as higher economic growth at the aggregate level (Becker
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1993, Schultz 1993, Lutz et al. 2008). All of these effects ought
to play a role in reducing vulnerability to climate hazards.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
To investigate the link between disaster risk, development in
general, and education in particular, we used data from the
Emergency Events Data Base (EM-DAT) provided by the
Centre for the Research of the Epidemiology of Disasters
(Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters 2004).
These data provide information on the number of disasters, as
well as the number of deaths caused by these disasters, by
country and year since 1900, with the data since 1980 being
the more reliable. Although data are available for a broad range
of different types of disasters, we concentrated on floods,
droughts, storms, mass movements, extreme temperature
events, and wildfires because they most closely resemble the
kinds of disasters that are expected to increase due to climate
change. 
Whether a specific event is listed as a disaster in the EM-DAT
database is determined by fulfillment of one of the following
criteria: (1) 10 or more people were reported killed; (2) 100
or more people were reported affected; (3) a call for
international assistance was issued, or; (4) a state of emergency
was declared. Due to these specific criteria there is the
possibility of sample selection bias. Some countries may have
experienced a natural disaster, but because they were so well
prepared none of the criteria necessary for being counted as a
natural disaster was fulfilled. On the other extreme, in some
very poorly developed regions disasters may have killed many
people but due to poor information it may not even be
registered and hence would not enter this database. In both
cases, however, the estimated effects of development
indicators on disaster deaths would only be biased downward.
For a comparison of EM-DAT with other sources of disaster
data, as well as a discussion of the strengths and weaknesses
of these data, see Guha-Sapir and Below 2002. 
Data on the level of human development and its components
were taken from the United Nation’s Human Development
Report (United Nations Development Programme 2010). The
HDI is a composite index measuring progress in the three basic
dimensions: health, knowledge, and income. While the
methodology of the HDI has been changed slightly in its
twentieth anniversary edition, for reasons of compatibility and
comparability with previous studies we used the original HDI
where the knowledge component was calculated using a
combination of school enrollment and rates of adult literacy. 
In addition to HDI and its components we also controlled for
education using data on the portion of 20 to 39-year-old
women with completed secondary education or higher among
the total female population aged 20 to 39. Past comprehensive
research on the effects of the entire educational distribution
(i.e., considering the distribution of educational attainment
categories by age and sex) for a whole range of issues, going
from economic growth to transition to free democracies, has
shown that explicit consideration of that distribution has
significant additional explanatory power compared to just
taking an average measure of education such as the mean years
of schooling (Lutz et al. 2008, Lutz et al. 2010). For practical
purposes it is often convenient to have only one education-
related variable included in the equation, so the one indicator
that still reflects the inequality aspect and has the greatest
discriminatory power—as shown by the above cited studies
—turns out to be the proportion of younger women with junior
secondary or higher education. Due to their key role in family
matters, ranging from childbearing to family health to
household decision making and changes in labor force
participation, this group seems to be of particular importance
for social as well as economic development. The data on
educational attainment by age and sex was taken from the
IIASA/VID data set (Lutz et al. 2007) which offers full
education details by age and sex for most countries of the world
from 1970 onwards in 5-year intervals. 
For the regression analysis we aggregated the data into 5-year
and 10-year periods in order to limit the influence of extreme
outlier years when certain countries experienced particularly
severe disasters with exceptionally high death counts and
because some of the social variables were available only for
5-year intervals. We then estimated a number of multivariate
models for the given panel of national time series. In all models
we used the natural logarithm of the total number of deaths
per thousand of population by country and period as our
dependent variable. This probability of dying from disaster
was then explained by different sets of development indicators
—including education—after controlling for some of the usual
background variables: real GDP per capita was taken from the
Penn World Tables (Heston et al. 2009); data on the degree of
democracy were taken from the Polity IV database (Marshall
and Jaggers 2002); and data on population size, population
density, as well as on infant mortality (IMR) stemmed from
the 2008 revision of the World Population Prospects (United
Nations Secretariat 2009).  
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Model 1 recurs to earlier findings by Patt et al. (2010) who
had used the HDI as an indicator of disaster vulnerability. HDI
is a very comprehensive indicator of development outcomes,
which in itself neither identifies the primary causes of
vulnerability nor suggests a particular policy priority. Hence,
in Model 2 we decomposed the HDI into its three constituent
subindices, one based on purchasing-power-adjusted per
capita income, another one combining school enrollment and
literacy rates, and finally an index derived from average life
expectancy at birth. Including these three individual
components of HDI separately in Model 2 yielded estimates
for the relative importance of the three dimensions on the
number of deaths from natural disasters. Yet, as discussed
above, the education component of the old HDI does not
explicitly measure education by the gender and age groups
that matter most for vulnerability to disaster. Model 3 therefore
uses our alternative education variable (eduFi,t) to account for
human capital. 
All three models also considered the effect of income. Whereas
GDP was implicitly included in the HDI in Model 1, Models
2 and 3 controlled for income explicitly by using the GDP
component of the HDI (hdiGDPi,t). This can help us to address
an important question for setting policy priorities, namely
whether income matters more than education in reducing a
country’s disaster death counts. 
Furthermore, we assumed that the quality of a country’s health
system should play a significant role in minimizing human
losses from natural disasters. Model 1 includes life expectancy
at birth implicitly in the HDI, while Models 2 and 3 included
it as a separate index (hdiLEXi,t). Because disaster deaths in a
given year are also reflected in the life table and hence life
expectancy of that year, as a sensitivity analysis we also used
the log of the infant mortality rate (imri,t) as an alternative
indicator of health system quality. While infant mortality is
not necessarily less affected by this possible endogeneity, it
would be differently affected (unless the infant deaths as a
proportion of all deaths are exactly the same in disasters and
under normal conditions). Furthermore, infant mortality is
often considered to be more closely related to the quality of
the health care system than adult mortality which also includes
many life-style-related factors (Fuchs et al. 2010). In any case,
as can be seen in Appendix 1, our results were not affected. 
In addition to these different development indicators all three
models controlled for a set of other variables which are labeled
“General” in the equations above. The exposure to climate-
related risk was accounted for in our models as the log of the
total number of disasters in the given period normalized by
the total population size in 1000s (nodisi,t). We also controlled
for population density (densityi,t), which has been found
significant in explaining casualty numbers by Yohe and Tol
(2002) and more recently by Patt et al. (2010). In terms of the
political system of the country we included the polity score
(polity2i,t) which has the highest values for modern free
democracies. We also control for the geophysical fact of
whether a country is landlocked or has a coastline (coastali),
which may affect its expose to tropical storms and flooding.
Finally, we controlled for possible regional particularities
(regioni) in the form of regional fixed effects that could also
account for other still-uncontrolled factors in our models. 
Due to the availability of population projections by age, sex,
and education (KC et al. 2010), we were also able to forecast
adaptive capacity based on different education scenarios under
the assumption of constant hazard levels.
RESULTS
Our analysis covers 130 countries over the time period 1980
to 2010. In the regression analysis we have complete data for
125 countries. Fig. 1 depicts the bivariate relationship between
the log of disaster deaths per 1000 (on the vertical axis) and
the proportion of women with completed junior secondary or
higher education in the age group 20 to 39. The hump shape
observed in Patt et al. (2010), who have examined the
relationship between disaster risk and aggregate HDI, is
present when one examines the full sample of countries (left
side), but then disappears when we exclude countries that
experience very few climate disasters. For all countries that
experienced at least 30 disasters over the 30-year period, i.e.,
one or more disasters on average per year, it shows a clearly
negative and almost linear association. As can be seen in
Appendix 1, the picture looks the same when using HDI
instead of our education variable.
Fig. 1. Relationship between the log of disaster deaths (per
1000 of 1980 population) and the mean of female education
(proportion with secondary and higher education among
women aged 20 to 39) over the period 1980 to 2010 for all
130 countries (left side) and 63 countries with one or more
disasters on average per year (right side).
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Table 1. Determinants of national death from natural disaster. Panel regression for 125 countries over 5-year and 10-year intervals
between 1980 and 2010 using time fixed effects. The dependent variable is the log of deaths per capita. Numbers in parentheses
are standard errors based on the heteroskedasticity-reistant and autocorrelation-resistant covariance matrix. HDI = human
development index. LEX = life expectancy at birth. EDU = education. Other independent variables not reported here are dummy
variables for 17 world regions. Significance codes: 0.01 = ***; 0.05 = **; 0.1 = *.
 
5-yr 10-yr 5-yr 10-yr 5-yr 10-yr
Log
(disasters/pop., in 1000s)
 
0.695***
(−0.075)
0.698***
(−0.115)
0.699***
(−0.075)
0.678***
(−0.114)
0.729***
(−0.075)
0.725***
(−0.115)
 
Log (density) 0.123*
(−0.067)
0.159*
(−0.096)
0.141**
(−0.068)
0.156
(−0.098)
0.118*
(−0.069)
0.136
(−0.1)
 
Polity score 0.296**
(−0.137)
0.364*
(−0.206)
0.290**
(−0.135)
0.347*
(−0.203)
0.279**
(−0.136)
0.322
(−0.206)
 
Coastal country 1.211***
(−0.189)
1.027***
(−0.272)
1.174***
(−0.188)
0.952***
(−0.269)
1.054***
(−0.19)
0.826***
(−0.275)
 
HDI −5.943***
(−0.818)
−6.658***
(−1.176)
 
LEX component of HDI −2.818**
(−1.135)
−1.321
(−1.633)
−3.274***
(−1.113)
−2.346
(−1.629)
 
GDP component of HDI −0.522
(−0.762)
−0.955
(−1.103)
−0.904
(−0.763)
−1.413
(−1.118)
 
EDU component of HDI −3.626***
(−0.741)
−5.125***
(−1.076)
 
Females, age 20 to 39 yr,
> secondary education
−1.912***
(−0.423)
−2.239***
(−0.625)
 
F-statistic 15.67 8.8 15.49 8.89 14.96 8.21
 
N 706 355 706 355 706 355
For the given panel of national time series we specified various
multivariate models in which the probability of dying from
natural disasters is related to various indicators of risk as well
as social and economic background factors. Results of three
of them are displayed in Table 1, where two neighboring
columns always belong to one model specification. As can be
seen from the number of observations, the left column of each
model corresponds to 5-year intervals and the right column to
10-year intervals.  
Model 1 shows the well-known negative relationship between
the HDI and human disaster losses. The linear effect of HDI
is highly significant for both panels (representing the 5-year
and 10-year intervals). We also tested for nonlinear effects
from HDI on disaster losses (results of which are shown in
Appendix 1) but they turn out to be insignificant. While the
results from Model 1 lend support to earlier findings that
negatively related development and disaster death counts, they
do not tell us which of the individual components of the HDI
are responsible for this decrease. Model 2 reveals that the only
truly significant component of the HDI is the education index.
The life expectancy component is significant with the 5-year
intervals but not with the 10-year intervals, whereas the GDP
component shows no significant additional explanatory power
whatsoever. Model 3 uses our alternative indicator of
educational attainment, yet the results turn out to convey the
same story. Female education is most significant in reducing
vulnerability to natural disasters.  
Most of the parameters for the control variables have the
expected signs, while their significance varies among the
models. The frequency of disasters as the key variable
measuring the exposure of countries to disasters independent
of the number of fatalities is, as expected, consistently positive
and highly significant under all models. Similarly, the fact that
a country has a coastline turns out to have a consistently
positive effect on the number of fatalities, and is significant
under all models. Also, not surprisingly, a country with higher
population density on average seems to have experienced a
higher number of casualties. What is rather surprising at first
glance, however, is the positive relationship between
vulnerability and the democracy score. While the effect is not
significant in all model specifications, it still seems to imply
that in more authoritarian countries, ceteris paribus, the
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vulnerability to natural disasters is reduced. This may in part
be true for cases such as Cuba, Iran, Singapore, and other
countries that have efficient disaster control systems, although
they are not free democracies. There are also countries labeled
as democracies—such as India and Bangladesh— that have
serious problems in handling disasters. But there clearly
remains a selectivity issue. Democratic governments may be
more ready to report disaster deaths than authoritarian ones.
Contrary to Costa (2012), we did not find a significant effect
when controlling for possible nonlinearity in the relationship
between the democracy score and deaths from natural disasters
(see Appendix 1). Clearly, this issue warrants further in depth
research. 
In sum, the results presented in Table 1 clearly show that
education (and in particular female education) is the single
most important social and economic factor associated with a
reduction in vulnerability to natural disasters. Both in the form
of the education component of the HDI and as measured by
the proportion of the female population aged 20 to 39 with
junior secondary and higher education, education has the most
significant and consistently positive effects under all models
and also when considering 5-year as well as 10-year intervals.
In terms of setting policy priorities and in linking this to
economic studies of vulnerability, which often uncritically
start from the assumption that higher income is the key
determinant for reducing vulnerability, it is important to note
that in none of the models did income (whether in the form of
the income component of the HDI or as conventional GDP per
capita or its growth rate) turn out to be significant if education
is being considered at the same time. This robust aggregate
level finding now needs to be complemented by further
microlevel evidence.
DISCUSSION
It is likely that over the next years, large amounts of money
will be spent on adaptation programs through the Kyoto
Protocol adaptation fund, national governments, or other
donors. But there is not enough of a scientific basis to guide
these funds into directions that are meaningful under a long-
term perspective. There is serious concern that significant
funds might be channeled into “investments” that (given the
strong path dependence of, e.g., agricultural policies) lock
countries into certain paths that are not tenable under future
climates. Alternatively, given the uncertainty about the precise
manifestations of climate change in specific areas, it may be
better to increase the general flexibility and enhance the human
and social capital through massive new investments in
universal basic education in order to empower the populations
to better cope with climate change in a way that will be to their
best long-term benefit. Our results reveal the degree to which
climate vulnerability is sensitive to differences in education
at the national level.  
Given this, new projections of populations by age and level
of education (KC et al. 2010) can also be used to anticipate
the future adaptive capacities of societies. Fig. 2 shows the
population pyramid for Sub-Saharan Africa in 2050 with the
colors indicating the level of education. Men and women
without any formal education are marked in red, those with
some primary education in yellow, those with completed
junior secondary education in light blue, and those with tertiary
education in dark blue. Today, more than half of young adult
women in Africa are still without secondary education. For
2050, Fig. 2-A depicts the results of projections in which age-
specific school enrollment rates at all levels are kept constant
at their current levels, which means that schools are only
expanding in parallel with the growth of the school-age
population (CER, constant enrollment rates scenario). In
contrast, Fig. 2-B shows a scenario in which school enrollment
rates over the coming years increase following the path of
other countries that had been at the same level earlier (GET,
global education trends scenario). In both cases the 2050
population sizes (1.9 billion in CER and 1.7 in GET) will be
a lot bigger than today (0.8 billion), with the difference
between CER and GET resulting from the fact that more
educated women have lower birth rates. Under the CER
scenario the number of young adults (in particular women)
will increase dramatically while under the GET scenario most
of the added population will be men and women with
secondary or higher education (in blue).
Fig. 2. Age pyramids by level of education for Sub-Saharan
Africa, for 2050. A – under the global education trends
(GET) scenario. B – under the constant enrollment rates
(CER) scenario.
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These are two very different societies projected for 2050. In
light of the empirical analysis presented here, the first one
would be highly vulnerable to possible increases in natural
disasters due to climate change, while the second one would
likely have considerably more adaptive capacity to cope with
whatever changes the future will bring. While calculating the
exact number of lives that can be saved by increasing
investments into education is impossible because of the high
uncertainty around future risk levels, we can use the upper and
lower bounds of past disaster-risk levels to calculate the
number of deaths under the CER and the GET scenarios. A
first back-of-the-envelope calculation combining the
projections shown in Fig. 2 with our regression results from
Model 3 in Table 1 reveals that in the time period 2040 to 2050
the number of deaths due to natural extreme events in Sub-
Saharan Africa under the CER scenario will be in the range
of 7900 to 180,000 while under the GET scenario the predicted
number of deaths ranges from 3200 to 72,200. Regardless of
the risk level the ratio between the scenarios is relatively stable
and important. It can account for between 4700 and 107,800
additional lives saved or lost, which corresponds to a reduction
of roughly 60%. Note that this tremendous effect is not only
due to the direct effect of education. The portion of women
aged 20 to 39 that have completed at least secondary education
will have reached almost 70% under the GET scenario,
compared to just 30% under the more pessimistic outlook. But
the difference between the two scenarios also has indirect
effects by means of reducing the affected population size as
well as population density in the GET scenario. If in the future
there are more disasters than in the past, the effects from
education—direct and indirect—would be even stronger.  
Which scenario will actually be more likely depends on
education policies in the near future. If nothing happens and
school expansion does not even keep pace with population
growth, the outcome would be even worse than under the CER
scenario. There are of course many other important reasons
for expanding school enrollment (and at the same time also
enhancing the quality of schooling) in terms of positive effects
on health and poverty reduction, which has led to the inclusion
of universal primary education as a Millennium Development
Goal (United Nations 2010). But viewing education as an
investment in the adaptive capacity to climate change would
be an important new policy focus.
Responses to this article can be read online at: 
http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/issues/responses.
php/5252
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1 Controlling for non-linearities
Since previous studies have found significant evidence for deaths from natural catastrophes to be
non-linearly related to different measures of development (Brooks et al. 2005, Kellenberg and
Mobarak 2008, Patt et al. 2010, Costa 2012), Table A presents the results of our panel regression
analysis controlling for quadratic effects. Two neighboring columns always belong to one model
specification. As can be seen from the number of observations, the left column corresponds to
5-year intervals and the right column to 10-year intervals. The dependent variable is the logged
value of the number of people killed per 1000 of national population.
Model (4) reproduces Model (1) from Table 1 in the main article. As an additional control it
includes HDI squared. While the squared term does not turn out to be significant, the linear effect
remains unchanged for both panels (the 5-year and 10-year intervals). Model (5) corresponds to
Model (2) from Table 1 in the main article and it shows a similar result controlling for the three
squared components of the HDI. While there is no additional explanatory power coming from the
GDP component of the HDI - neither in linear, nor in non-linear form - there seems to be some evi-
dence for the relationship between life expectancy and death counts to be u-shaped. The education
index, however, remains the strongest and most significant component of the HDI in explaining
variation in the number of deaths from natural catastrophes and again, there doesn’t appear to be a
non-linear relationship.
Since we find an unexpected positive relationship between the polity score and our measure of
vulnerability, in Model (6) of Table A we also test for non-linearities in democratization. But even
in this specification, we find no evidence of a u-shaped pattern.
Finally, Figure A corresponds to Figure 1 in the article showing the bivariate relationship be-
tween deaths from natural catastrophes and the share of women aged 20-39 with at least secondary
education. As can be seen, we find the same pattern when plotting the total number of deaths
against the average HDI-value for each country between 1980 and 2010.
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